Other special-issue authors utilized different types of constitutional argument.
Like Hindman, several other authors in the 1992 Journalism Quarterly special issue used the doctrinal approach to assess the state of the First Amendment. Simon (1992) criticized the traditional logical argument method of communication law scholarship, contending researchers could make a more significant contribution by doing something lawyers and judges were not already doing, namely providing factual data and analysis . Teeter Jr. (1992) despaired that some long-standing battles for freedom of the press had not yet been won, but he saw hope in the individual self-fulfillment value as well as the marketplace of ideas. Hale (1992) combined a doctrinal analysis with a systematic approach to quantify the legal wins and losses of mass media.
Other special-issue authors utilized different types of constitutional argument. Blanchard (1992) and Cobb-Reiley (1992) took historical approaches to examining freedom of speech and press, and Cobb-Reiley in particular related her historical research to First Amendment theory. Parramore (1992) adopted a textual, historical and structural hybrid approach to show that some states protected mass media freedoms more vigorously than the federal system. The contribution of one special-issue author stood out: Walden (1992) criticized the focus on freedom of expression theory because, she argued, it distracted from the effort to keep government action from abridging speech and press rights. She advocated instead a focus on the government's purpose or intent in taking action affecting free expression. 
Values of Freedom of Expression in Mass Communication
In the 1992 Journalism Quarterly special issue on the First Amendment, Blanchard and Cobb-Reiley demonstrated that historical free-speech values can inform contemporary understanding. Accordingly, a good place to begin discussion of the values of freedom of expression is ancient Greece. The Greeks esteemed parrhêsia, "the courageous expression of one's beliefs, however unpopular they may be" (Sluiter & Rosen, 2004 ). An important characteristic of parrhêsia was to stop self-censorship of true statements but only as long as the speaker had a good-faith belief in their truthfulness. The related concept of isêgoria, equality of speech rooted in aristocratic opposition to tyranny, promoted individual autonomy and development but not solely as an individual matter. Rather, isêgoria prioritized individuals pursuing their own welfare as citizens because doing so resulted in a better society (Raaflaub, 2004 ).
In the Athenian view of parrhêsia and isêgoria, "community interests came first" (Wallace, 2004) . Freedom of speech strengthened civic self-confidence and courage, including in battle. Demosthenes, for example, argued that citizens in absolute government systems who failed to fulfill their civic and military duties feared their rulers but not their peers. Meanwhile, idle citizens in a democracy did not have reason to fear their governors but did fear the reproach of fellow-citizens exercising their freedom of speech (Balot, 2004) . Among societal values of freedom of expression, ancient Greeks underscored social cohesion. Equality, including of speech, allowed individuals of different ranks to form a cohesive new colony, and free speech in democracy could not only facilitate decision-making but also could "broaden the civic base in order to reduce factional strife and achieve political stability" (Raaflaub, 2004 propaganda and efforts to suppress dissent. Cobb-Reiley (1992) showed that Progressive Era scholars by 1914 already had moved beyond a narrow Blackstonian view of freedom of speech as a mere prohibition against prior restraint. Instead, Progressive Era scholarship by Schofield used a historical-structural approach to show the First Amendment represented the people's power over the government and "liberty of the press included the right to shame or intimidate oppressive officers into more honorable and just modes of conducting affairs" (p. 42).
An early and influential article argued against the excesses of the press. Warren and Brandeis did not completely discount the role of free speech and press, but they began with an assumption that " [t] he press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of decency" (1890, p. 196) . Their view of the societal values harmed by the press invasion stemmed, at least in part, from personal negative experiences with journalists (Gajda, 2008) .
The articulated basis, however, included extensive doctrinal review of precedent cases in Great Britain and the United States. The authors analogized values and associated rules from other legal doctrines, including libel and copyright. In the end, Warren and Brandeis expressed a view of the value of privacy that has resonated for more than a century:
Each crop of unseemly gossip, thus harvested, becomes the seed of more, and, in direct proportion to its circulation, results in a lowering of social standards and of morality. Even gossip apparently harmless, when widely and persistently circulated, is potent for evil. It both belittles and perverts. It belittles by inverting the relative importance of things, thus dwarfing the thoughts and aspirations of a people (1890, p. 196) . Court's decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) . Several nuanced versions of the development exist (Bollinger, 1983; Gray, 1994; Redish, 1982) . In a nutshell, scholars canonized a set of free expression values that mostly focus on societal benefit. Freedom of expression enables the search for truth in the marketplace of ideas (Abrams v. United States, 1919) . Free expression facilitates democratic decision-making (Meiklejohn, 1961) , promotes tolerance, especially for minority voices (Bollinger, 1988) , serves as a societal safety valve (Emerson, 1970) and provides a check on government abuse of power (Blasi, 1977 ). An individual value of free expression focuses on self-fulfillment and autonomy (Richards, 1974) .
In an article later named a top 50 classic in Quarterly, Hindman (1992) focused on four theorists who discussed the marketplace of ideas model. Although Chafee, Emerson, Blasi and Baker agreed to some extent with the liberal theoretical conclusion that individual journalists had the right to be irresponsible, Hindman found in each of them notions that the press as a whole had certain democratic and even constitutional responsibilities. She recounted that Chafee, a
First Amendment scholar and member of the Hutchins Commission, argued the press had a public service role to facilitate truth by expanding opportunities for expression of diverse viewpoints. According to Chafee, the press role was not legally enforceable but stemmed from moral and professional roots. Still, if the press failed to ensure diversity, the government could step in to make market corrections.
Emerson, meanwhile, perceived mass media had a responsibility to promote four values of freedom of expression. In his view, as interpreted by Hindman, broadcast media could be compelled, while print media should be expected but not compelled, to promote self-fulfillment, advance knowledge, inform citizens and establish a stable society. For Blasi, the marketplace of ideas would not likely lead to truth and yet he generally opposed government intervention to fix it. He emphasized the checking value of freedom of the press, in that news media should gather information, pass judgment on official conduct and disseminate their judgment to the public.
Hindman said Blasi would afford nearly absolute protection to criticism of public officials in their official duties, but he believed the actual malice rule of Sullivan served to guarantee some press accountability and, thus, credibility in the eyes of the public.
Hindman then wrote that Baker's liberty theory "protects the speaker in the act of speaking, rather than the speech and its content" (p. 59). Baker believed the process, rather than outcome, of speech deserved protection under a self-fulfillment and autonomy rationale. For
Baker, though, the institutional press did not merit protection under the liberty theory, which he applied only to individuals. While the press had a role, in his view, to serve as a check on government abuse of power and to provide information, the functioning of the press in its role determined whether it actually enjoyed the privilege of serving the public interest.
Methodological Approaches of Mass Communication Law and Policy Research
This section outlines, in broad terms, the methodological approaches common to law and Bobbitt (1982) . He contended that five archetypes-historical, textual, structural, prudential and doctrinal-were common, and he advocated for recognition of a sixth he called ethical but clarified was about American identity and conscience rather than morality.
Bobbitt criticized the narrow historical approach that would purport to understand the intent of the Framers of the Constitution. The narrow historical approach may be identified with originalism (Silver, 2011) . But Bobbitt saw the value in a broader historical approach, one divorced from specific texts and aimed at providing context rather than trying to "establish a single meaning conclusively" (Bobbitt, 1982, p. 21) . Smith (1984) 
used a historical approach in
Journalism Quarterly to demonstrate the early American colonial death of seditious libel at the hands of newspaper publishers who saw the press as a protection against tyranny. Similarly, Nord (1985) concluded the 1735 John Peter Zenger case showed an American commitment to the right to speak truth, including religious truth, rather than a libertarian commitment to individual freedom.
Textual arguments purport to be powerful and simple but they may miss the point.
Constitutional meaning sometimes hinges on what was not said or on language that has either changed over time or failed to change appropriately over time in line with the concepts being represented. If language and concepts are in alignment over time, then textual approaches have the potential to serve as "a valve through which contemporary values can be intermingled with the Constitution" (Bobbitt, 1982, p. 36) . Structural argument is a macro-textual approach, and it relies on examination of the relationships among constitutional actors and entities. Quarterly uses doctrinal and textual analysis to give practical guidance. Some scholars set out to educate mass communication faculty and students about the laws and regulations governing their professional work (Middleton, 1979) . Scholarship has addressed mass communications faculty about their teaching and research, such as the legality of recording television programs under the U.S. Copyright Act (Francois, 1980) . Advising faculty how to instruct their students about the vagaries of copyright law persists (Bunker, 2010) . In providing instruction and guidance,
Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly tracks its peers. For example, authors in a
Broadcast Education Association journal have long given practical instruction on conducting research, including primers on legal concepts and guides for finding and interpreting legal materials (Foley, 1973; Le Duc, 1973) .
Fundamentally, mass communication law scholarship makes a legal argument, generally including logical reasoning supported by citations to precedent cases and other authorities.
Researchers in Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly employ various constitutional
argument archetypes, sometimes in hybrid fashion within a single article. The argument may go against the weight of legal authority (Riley & Shandle, 1974) . Scholars in Quarterly have not been reluctant to criticize the work or argue against the logic of Congress (Chaney, 1978; Hanks & Coran, 1986) , the Federal Communications Commission (Gleason, 1991) , other prominent scholars (Boyer, 1975) , and, of course, judges (McCarthy, 1979; Leeper, 1993) . At times legal scholarship plays a direct advocacy role with regard to changes needed in legislation or proposed legislation (Atwater, 1983; Cooper, 1991; Pritchard & Sanders, 1991) .
One useful doctrinal approach examines lower-court interpretations of a seminal U.S.
Supreme Court case (Bunker, 2010; Kozlowski, Bullard & Deets, 2009; Hovland & Taylor, 1990) . Some authors opt for a relatively straightforward textual explanation of the application of a statute (Collins, 1987; Middleton, 1979) . Others analyze a single court decision (Pritchard, 2013; Gross, 1973) or administrative agency adjudication (Gleason, 1991) and then discuss the implications. Still other doctrinal articles collect and analyze a series of lower-court cases on an issue the U.S. Supreme Court has not addressed directly (Stevens, 1989) , and they may impose a time frame for their analysis-a decade, for example (Sneed & Stonecipher, 1986) . Scholars apply existing legal concepts to technological developments (Hightower, 1975; Collins, 1987; O'Neill, 1994 Quarterly. Further, in part because the legal system has its own detailed process for admitting and weighing evidence, including expert-witness testimony (Robbins, 1972b) , the empirical challenges associated with law are general and not confined to mass communication.
The relationship between law and empiricism presents difficulties (Reynolds & Barnett, 2006) , and some have contended mass communication law and policy research needs to increase and improve its empirical work (Cohen & Gleason, 1990) . While the modern empirical legal studies movement is of relatively recent vintage (Eisenberg, 2011; Sisk, 2008) Communication Quarterly concerns the tension between free press and fair trial (Hightower, 1975; Tankard, Jr., Middleton, & Rimmer, 1979; Jennings II, 1982) . Researchers employed surveys and experiments to understand other mass communication law and policy questions. For example, two researchers surveyed student media advisers, student editors and school principals, and the researchers concluded those groups needed more training to accurately decide the outcome of media law dilemmas (Broussard & Blackmon, 1978) . While that research gauged the accuracy of the respondents' conclusions about hypothetical situations, a similar survey during the same era measured attitudes, beliefs and opinions in a more straightforward way (Trager & Dickerson, 1980) .
The critical legal studies movement (Unger, 1983) 
Mass Communication Law Values in Quarterly Since 1992
In the decade following the First Amendment special issue (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (Leeper, 1993; Bush, 1994; Burrowes, 1997; Najjar, 1998; Bunker, 2000; Perkins, 2001; Kerr, 2002) . Two historical articles also contextualized their work with theory (Ross, 1998; Mizuno, 2001 (Bunker, 1993; Hopkins, 1996; Bunker & Davis, 1998; Bunker & Tobin, 1998; Ekstrand, 2002) .
The doctrinal articles that did touch on values or theory deserve additional consideration. Hopkins (1996) noted scholarly criticisms of the marketplace metaphor, including by Barron (1967) . Barron said the marketplace model may be naïve in its assumptions that truth will actually exist in the marketplace and will rise to the forefront, and that rational people will have non-discriminatory access to ideas in the market. All 15 of the other articles using a doctrinal approach, however, seemed squarely within the Walden invitation to focus on state action rather than values or theory (Bunker & Splichal, 1993; Youm, 1993; Bunker, Gates & Splichal, 1993; Splichal & Chamberlin, 1994; O'Neill, 1994; Dupagne, 1994; Chang, 1994; Bunker, 1995; Bunker, 1996; Packer & Gower, 1997; Rivera-Sanchez & Ballard, 1998; Koehler, 1999; Bunker, 2001; Halstuk & Chamberlin, 2001; Ross, 2002) . In a doctrinal examination of student expression, Ross (2002) (Gleason, 1993; Lipschultz & Hilt, 1993; Lawson, 1994) . Finally, Quarterly in that same time period also published eight articles on legal topics that did not use legal research methods, and several of those involved mass communication theories other than First Amendment theory (Jones, 1994; Mason, 1995; Thompson, 1995; Grimes & Drechsel, 1996; Knudson, 1996; Voakes, 1998; Borden, 1998; Wyatt, Kim & Katz, 2000) . (Bunker & Bolger, 2003; Carter & Clark, 2006; Carter, 2008; Kozlowski, Bullard & Deets, 2009; Silver, 2011) . In the same period, five additional law and policy articles adopted a doctrinal approach with little or no explicit theory discussion (Carter, 2005; Bunker, 2010; Kozlowski, 2011; Stewart, 2013; Pritchard, 2013) .
In addition, from 2003-2015 Quarterly published two policy or historical articles that did not attempt to engage First Amendment theory significantly (Hawkins & Hawkins, 2003; Bates, 2011) . During that same time frame, the journal published three articles on legal topics that did not use legal research methods and did not engage First Amendment theory (Reader, 2012; Relly, 2012; Bernhard & Dohle, 2014) .
Although it remains too early to tell if it was a blip or start of a trend, the year 2016 marked a change. In that year, partly due to a special issue of Quarterly titled "Information Access and Control in an Age of Big Data," law and policy articles surged. At least six articles published in 2016 could be considered squarely within mass communication law and policy.
Three articles used structural approaches and discussed theory or values (Camaj, 2016; Ginosar & Krispil, 2016; Youm & Park, 2016) , while two other articles used doctrinal approaches and at least mentioned theory or values (Bunker & Calvert, 2016; Stewart & Littau, 2016) . A sixth article used a non-legal research method but nonetheless made a significant contribution to understanding the chilling effect related to one's perception of being subject to online government surveillance (Stoycheff, 2016) .
The most significant conclusion to come out of this review of law and policy articles in
Quarterly after the 1992 special issue may be the relationship between structuralism and theory. Hindman's doctrinal analysis followed suit. Accordingly, a doctrinal approach applied to discussions of theory can produce substantive theoretical developments.
Doctrinal articles in

The Value and Challenges of Mass Communication Law Values
Mass communication law and policy research that analyzes free expression values can make a valuable contribution to the development of theory and, perhaps, the law itself.
Compared to other constitutional topics, free speech and free press appear to be strong candidates for scholarly discussion of values: "Freedom of speech is not only a value that, like other societal values, is created through the use of language: in this case, the value is also about language, and one's view of language and the way it works may influence one's views on FirstAmendment protection" (Sluiter and Rosen, 2004 ).
Walden ( Research in mass communication law and policy is beginning to account for contemporary changes in the characteristics of citizenship (Nelson, Lewis & Lei, 2017; Balkin, 2004) . Further research is needed on these issues as well as the power of corporations-Facebook, for example-over freedom of expression, and on the role of mass communication in a "post-truth"
or "alternative facts" world, among other topics. Given that not even legal research methods are static (Podboy, 2000) , scholars in mass communication law and policy should continually reexamine their approaches and application of free expression values.
One fruitful area for exploring free-speech values involves foreign, international and comparative law. While just one international-structural article with discussion of theory (Perkins, 2001) Meanwhile, category four lists "propaganda campaigns and fabrications" as evidence of leading actors' motivations toward genocide. Similarly, "inflammatory rhetoric or hate propaganda" are listed in category five as circumstances that facilitate genocide because they suggest impunity.
Finally, hate speech is also classified in category seven as evidence of intent to destroy a particular group (Office of the UN Special Adviser).
Although freedom of expression protects some undesirable speech, the inclusion of independent media in category two, as a barrier to genocide, is critical. An independent and responsible press corps can counteract the effect of hate speech and genocidal propaganda. The role of independent press in modern liberal democracy to serve as a watchdog on government and fulfill the checking value is critical here. Although the "Analysis Framework" does not It is critical for effective early warnings that news articles themselves be accurate and independent from would-be human rights violators and propagandists. Of course, these results are difficult to ensure. But since independent news media not only serve as a check on abuse of power, as indicated in "Analysis Framework" category two, but also independent and accurate news accounts are used to assess risk factors relating to other categories in the "Analysis Framework," it must be recognized that a vital part of a nation's responsibility to protect human rights is ensuring freedom and responsibility of the press. The idea that mass communication functions to preserve life and prevent violence may not be easily accepted within a traditional view of free press under the First Amendment. But in the international law context, it seems relatively uncontroversial. Further research would be needed to explore the role of mass communication in the international human rights law sphere.
A structural approach could be taken to analyze the relationships among state actors, mass media and others as envisioned in international human rights law treaties such as ICCPR. Challenges could include language and cultural differences as well as differences in government structures, the role of mass communication and expectations of and by citizens. As is evident from the example, press independence could be threatened in various ways by reliance on mass communication to facilitate human rights and preserve life. Although scholars like Walden make valid counterpoints that should not be disregarded, the work of Hindman and others who followed speaks to the value of the effort and demonstrates the way forward.
Conclusion
